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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: DISCRETION OF A TRIAL JUDGE
TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL ON THE BASIS OF A HUNG JURY
Historically, the trial judge has always been given broad discretion in deciding
whether to discharge a jury unable to reach a verdict. It is settled law that if the
judge acts within his permitted discretion, the accused may be retried without
running afoul of the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment. I No
concrete guidelines have been developed by the federal courts for defining the
extent of the trial court's discretion, but it is evident that there is an increasing
tendency by reviewing courts to scrutinize the trial judge's decision to declare a
2
mistrial and dismiss the hung jury.
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall... be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 3 In Benton v.
Maryland,4 the Supreme Court held that the guarantee against double jeopardy
was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendmenLs The guarantee
consists of three separate constitutional protections. "It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense." 6 The purpose of the prohibition
against multiple prosecutions for a single offense is to limit the expense and
personal strain imposed on an accused and to diminish "the possibility that even
7
though innocent he may be found guilty."
For the double jeopardy protection to operate, the accused must initially have
been in jeopardy.8 In a non-jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to
hear evidence; in ajury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and
sworn. 9 Thus, in certain circumstances, the double jeopardy protection includes
the right not to be subjected to two prosecutions even when the first trial is
inconclusive. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this rule, and it is
established law that to be twice tried for the same offense is not necessarily"to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' 0 As the Supreme Court has stated:
The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment, however, does not mean that
1. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461-62 (1973); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S.
256, 9 Wheat 579 (1824).

2.
3.

See notes 25-27 infra and accompanying text.
U.S. Const. amend. V. For historical discussions of the double jeopardy clause see United

States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-42 (1975); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-55 (1959) (Black,

J., dissenting); United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870-78 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358
(1975).
4. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
5. Id. at 793-96.

6. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
7. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
8. The double jeopardy prohibition is not aimed against being twice punished but rather
against being twice tried for the same offense. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
9. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).

10.

For situations in which retrial has been allowed after mistrial see Annot., 6 L. Ed. 2d

1510 (1962).
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every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go
free if the trial fails to end in a final judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable
obstacle to the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance
of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibition is aimed.
There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its
completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict."
The courts have resorted to the concept of "manifest necessity" in defining
the circumstances during a criminal proceeding which allow a proper mistrial
declaration by the judge and a subsequent permissible retrial of the defendant. The manifest necessity doctrine first appeared in United States v.
Perez, 12 in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be retried
following a mistrial, when the judge, without the defendant's consent, has
discharged a jury that reported itself unable to reach a verdict. In that
landmark decision, Justice Story, writing for the Court, declared:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with
the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion,
taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act,
or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound
discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which
would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the
greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes
.... But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the
public have for the faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests, in
this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths of office.'5
The doctrine established by Perez has been closely adhered to by the federal
courts. It serves as the standard to be followed in deciding whether to allow
reprosecution when, in spite of defendant's objection, a mistrial has been
declared. 14 The rule has allowed trial judges to exercise their discretion in
declaring a mistrial not only in the hung jury situation, but also in other
instances where the "ends of public justice" would be defeated by the
15
continuation of the trial.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949).
22 U.S. 256, 9 Wheat. 579 (1824).
Id.
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461 (1973), called Perez "Itihe fountainhead decision

construing the Double Jeopardy Clause in the context of a declaration of a mistrial over a
defendant's objection." In God v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961), the Perez decision was
termed "the authoritative starting point of our law . . . statfingl principles which have since
guided the federal courts in their application of the concept of double jeopardy to situations
giving rise to mistrials."
15. Reprosecution has been constitutionally permitted in the following cases where the trial
was terminated without a verdict: Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (defendant was
brought to trial under an incurably defective indictment); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466
(1965) (possible juror contamination because jury had been in custody of two deputy sheriffs who
were principal prosecution witnesses); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964) (defendant
requested and obtained a mistrial); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (tactical situation of an
advancing army made place of trial impracticable); Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916)
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In considering the various ways in which a trial may come to a premature
end, the courts have eschewed the formulation of a rigid set of rules. 6
Instead, they have acknowledged the discretion of the trial court,17 and have
affirmed the decisions of trial judges with little more than perfunctory
review. 18 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has initiated the
exercise of a greater degree of scrutiny over the declaration of mistrials. 19
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rarely attempted to set down concrete
guidelines in this area. The few attempts involved trials which were aborted
for reasons other than a hung jury. Reprosecution was constitutionally
permitted where the trial court declared a mistrial for the sole benefit of the
defendant. 20 Yet, a plurality of the Court later rejected this guideline, and
instead required the trial judge to consider procedural alternatives to mistrials
before he could properly abort the trial. 21 The Court seemingly backed away
(defendant did not plead to the indictment after having a demurrer overruled), United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (conviction overturned because of insufficient indictment); Thompson v.
United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (juror was member of grand jury that indicted defendant);
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (juror lied on voir dire as to acquaintance with
defendant); United States ex rel. Stewart v. Hewitt, 517 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1975)
(possible jury bias because father-in-law of defendant on trial for wife's murder served as tipstaff
for jury); Whitfield v. Warden, 486 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974)
(possibility that juror overheard arguments between opposing counsel which would bias him);
United States ex rel. Gibson v. Ziegele, 479 F.2d 773 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973)
(key witness too ill to testify); Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 867 (1968) (defendant became too incapacitated to stand trial); United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d
453 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967) (juror read prejudicial newspaper articles); Crawford
v. United States, 285 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (jury exhibited confusion as to what it actually
decided); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949)
(district attorney referred to another criminal case pending against defendant in jury's presence);
United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584 (1941) (juror became too ill
to continue deliberations); Freeman v. United States, 237 F. 815 (2d Cir. 1916) (judge became ill
during trial); United States v. Holland, 378 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem. sub nom. In re Ehly.
506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 994 (1975) (juror became physically and
emotionally unable to continue); Conner v. Deramus, 374 F. Supp. 504 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (witness
made prejudicial remarks during trial); United States v. Giles, 19 F. Supp. 1009 (W. D. Okla. 1937)
(trial judge made prejudicial comments during trial).
For a recent overall discussion of "manifest necessity" see Comment, Retrial after Mistriak The
Double Jeopardy Doctrine of Manifest Necessity, 45 Miss. L.J. 1272 (1974).
16. A "mechanical rule" prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compelled the discharge
of a jury without the defendant's consent was termed "too high a price to pay for the added
assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment which such a
mechanical rule would provide." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971).
17. The trialjudge is "best situated intelligently" to make a decision whether to continue the triaL
Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961).
18. In God, Justice Frankfurter statedz "It is also dear that.., we have consistently declined
to scrutinize with sharp surveillance the exercise of [the trial judge's] discretion." Id.
19. Compare Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902);
and Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) with Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973);
United States v. Jor, 400 U S. 470 (1971); and Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
20. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961).
21. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 487 (1971).
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from this latter standard in Illinois v. Somerville, 22 when it held that a trial
judge could properly declare a mistrial where a procedural error on the trial

would make reversal on appeal a certainty. Whether this decision leaves the

federal courts with no real standard to follow is unclear.2 3 Still, it is axiomatic

that with an increase in review comes an attendant decrease in the discretion
reserved to the trial judge. It is this trend, as it affects the area of mistrial

resulting from a hung jury, that this Note now considers.
In the years following Perez, the hung jury question has rarely ascended

higher than the level of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court has
reviewed only a few cases involving this issue, and in each, the Court
reaffirmed the manifest necessity doctrine and its emphasis on "the sound
exercise of [the trial judge's] discretion.

24

Similarly, the early court of appeals

and district court decisions, perhaps guided by the Supreme Court's treatment
of the subject, did little more than accept the trial judge's discretionary
decision. 25 Only recently have the federal courts begun to examine the actions
As yet the judge has very rarely been held to
of the trial judge more closely.26
27
have abused his discretion.
Two recent decisions, United States v. Beckerman2 8 in the Second Circuit,
and United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas2 9 in the Third
Circuit, have confronted the question of whether "the defendant's interest in
proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and equally legitimate
'30
demand for public justice.
In Beckerman, a mistrial was declared by the trial court because the jury
failed to agree on a verdict. The defendant was charged with possession and

distribution of cocaine in a single count indictment. 3 1 The trial, which took
about three days, was the first to which the accused was subjected. After

deliberating for about seven hours, the jury sent a note to the judge stating

that it was deadlocked. 32 The trial court, addressing the forewoman, asked if
22. 410 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1973).
23. See Note, Mistrial and Double Jeopardy, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 937, 943-48 (1974).
24. See Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1902);
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892).
25. See, e.g., Kastel v. United States, 23 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
604 (1928); Linden v. United States, 2 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1924); United States v. Lee, 123 F, 741
(N.D. Cal. 1903).
26. See, e.g., United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973);
United States v. Brahm, 459 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972),
27. Few cases have been found, all decided within the past three years, in which the appellate
court did not accept the trial court's exercise of discretion in declaring a mistrial on the basis of a
hung jury. These cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 36-40 & 59-62 infra.
28. 516 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1975).
29. 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975).
30. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973). This has been termed a "balancing test,"
which at least one justice feels was adopted by the Supreme Court's most recent decision dealing with
the termination of a jury trial prior to the return of a verdict. Id. at 477 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. 516 F.2d at 905.
32. Id. at 907.
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more time would enable the jury to reach a verdicL With some equivocation,
the forewoman answered in the negative.3 3 Defense counsel did not object to
the discharge of the jury. 34 The Second Circuit affirmed the order of the
district court denying a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of double
3
jeopardy, thereby making reprosecution possible. S
In Webb, a mistrial was declared, over the objection of Webb's counsel, but
the judgment of the district court denying a writ of habeas corpus was
reversed by the Third Circuit. 36 The petitioner had been charged with
robbery. His first trial lasted over a week. After almost two days of deliberations, the judge summoned the jury to the courtroom. The judge stated
that his questions were addressed to each of the jurors and asked "whether
they were close to a verdict; whether they felt that given additional time they
would be able to reach a verdict; and whether they felt themselves hopelessly
deadlocked." 37 Each juror indicated agreement with the foreman's statement
that the jury was not close to a verdict and that it was hopelessly dead38
locked.
Webb was brought to trial again, with the second trial lasting approximately four days. The jury had deliberated for over six and one-half hours
when the judge, on his own initiative, asked the jury to return to the
courtroom. 39 Addressing only the foreman, the judge asked if there was any
hope of arriving at a verdict. The foreman unequivocally replied in the

negative, whereupon the judge, again over defense counsel's objection,
40
discharged the jury.
33.

The opinion set this important discussion out in full:

"The Court: Ladies and gentlemen I have your note which reads We the jury are deadlocked.'
"Does that mean that you are not able to reach a verdict, and the question I want to put to you
whether you feel with a little more time you might be able to reach a verdict?

"The Forelady: It is very hard to say. We are all very tired at this time and our biggest problem
is we don't think we have enough evidence and this is our biggest hassle and maybe another time,
another day we may be clearer.
"The Court: The question I asked you was whether you thought with more time you would be

able to reach a verdict, so the answer is no, is that it?
"The Forelady:. The way it seems now, it doesn't seem as though we will be able to.
"Mr. Polstein [defense counsel]: May I make a suggestion?
"The Court. No, you may not.
"Thank you very much. The Court is going to declare a mistrial, the jury is excused."
[Defense Counsel requested the Court to charge the jury once again on the burden of proof
before it was dismissed.]
"The Court: The jury is dismissed." Id. at 908.
34.

Id. at 909 & n.8.

35.

Id.at 910.

36.

516 F.2d 1034, 1045 (3d Cir. 1975).

37. Id. at 1035.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1035-36.

40. The following is the entire colloquy which took place between the judge and the jury
foreman:
"The Court: Mr. Foreman, is there any hope of arriving at a verdict?
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Many of the facts and procedures involved in Webb and Beckerman proved
to be similar. This is not to say, however, that differences were not present.
In Beckerman, there was no objection by counsel to the declaration of a
mistrial, 4 1 whereas, in Webb, counsel did object at both trials. 4 2 The jury first
brought up the issue of deadlock in Beckerman,43 but in Webb, "the impetus
44
for a mistrial was provided solely by the judge rather than by the jurors.
In both Beckerman's first trial and Webb's second trial, the judge spoke
only to the foreman/forewoman in questioning the jury as to whether a verdict
could be reached. No poll of the jurors was taken in either case. In
Beckerman, the forewoman answered with some equivocation, 45 but in Webb,
the foreman clearly stated that more time would not be of assistance. 46 The
appellate court nevertheless held in Webb that the record did "not furnish an
adequate showing that it was the collective sentiment of the jury that they
had reached an impasse," 47 while in Beckerman, the court noted that "[tlhere
"The Foreman: I don't believe so, sir.
"The Court: Do you believe that further deliberation might be fruitful?
"The Foreman: No, I do not.
"The Court- Do you feel that your positions are so adamant that you couldn't possibly arrive at
a unanimous verdict? Is that what you're telling me?
"The Foreman: Yes, sir, I do believe that.
"The Court: All right. I discharge you from further consideration of the case. You may report
to the jury room tomorrow morning." Id. at 1036.
The court of appeals noted that "[t]he entire proceedings from the jury's return to the
courtroom to the adjournment of the court . . . consumed only seven minutes." Id.
41. Because defense counsel was silent on the prospect of a mistrial, the trial court construed
an agreement by counsel that the jury, even with more time, would be unable to reach a verdict.
The court of appeals approved and considered this to be implied consent by the defense to a
mistrial declaration. 516 F.2d at 909. The decision also maintained that the defense had ample
time in which to object to the mistrial if it had an interest in having guilt determined by the
empaneled jury. Id.
42. The opinion stated that before a trial judge dismisses a jury over the defendant's
objection, he must " 'take care to assure himself that the situation warrants action on his part
foreclosing the defendant from a potentially favorable judgment.' " 516 F.2d at 1043, quoting
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971).
43. Without initial prodding by the judge, the jury sent her a note indicating it was
deadlocked. 516 F.2d at 907.
44. 516 F.2d at 1043. The jury had never indicated to the judge that it felt unable to agree on
a verdict; yet, the judge called the jury into the courtroom and asked the foreman whether there
was any hope of arriving at a verdict. Id. at 1036.
45. See note 33 supra.
46. See note 40 supra.
47. 516 F.2d at 1044. The majority opinion noted the possibility that one or more of the
jurors may have "stood sufficiently in awe of the authority of the court" so as to deter them from
"making unsolicited comments on the jury's progress." Id. The appellate court in Webb also
contrasted Webb's second trial with his first, where the trial judge "made a scrupulous effort to
ensure that he observed each juror's reply." Id. at 1043 n.54.
In the dissent, Judge Weis claims that "[tihe experience of most trial judges is that jurors will
correct a statement made by their spokesman which is contrary to their understanding. A poll
would have made the record more complete, but I am unwilling to say that a failure to follow
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was no report that the jury was on the verge of a verdict," and "[nlone of the
reach a verdict nor that
other jurors gave any indication that they could
'48
additional time would cure their disagreement.
Both cases involved issues which were not conceptually complex. 9 In both
trials, the jury deliberated for under seven hours after hearing over three days
of testimony. Beckerman concluded that the time the jury spent in deliberation was "not the determinant factor,15 0 whereas Webb maintained that this
jury's ability to arrive at a unanimous verdict
"is not irreconcilable with the
51
within a reasonable time."1
The most distinguishing feature of the two cases is that, unlike Beckerman,
where the defendant was subjected to only one trial, the defendant in Webb
had already twice gone through " 'the heavy personal strain which a criminal
trial represents for the individual defendant' ",S2Webb held that because this
was the defendant's second trial, the trial judge should have exercised "even
greater caution" before depriving him of the opportunity" 'of being able, once
and for all, to conclude5 3his confrontation with society through the verdict' of
the jury then sitting."
Webb seems to stand for the proposition that the trial judge's discretion to
declare a mistrial should be restricted when the defendant has already been
subjected to a previous prosecution. Thus, the factors which may support a
mistrial in a defendant's first trial may not be a basis for properly aborting a
defendant's second trial. In order to help evaluate the effect that each of the
factors in Webb had on the outcome of that case, it is instructive to compare
them with similar factors in prior cases dealing with the mistrial-hung jury
situation.
A comparison of the length and complexity of the trial in relation to the
time the jury spent in deliberations in recent cases seems to indicate that while
this factor is significant when taken in conjunction with other issues, it is not
the determining factor in deciding whether a mistrial was properly declared.
In United States v. See, 54 the jury deliberated for ten hours following a three
and a half day trial involving a single count indictment. 5s By comparison, the
that procedure is a reversible omission." Id. at 1046 (Weis, J.,dissenting). Thus, the dissent in
Webb, in essence, agrees with the opinion in Beckerman.
48. 516 F.2d at 910.
49. Both Beckerman and Webb involved a one count indictment and one defendant. Webb,
in holding that the jury was not given a "reasonable time" to reach a verdict, characterized the
contested issue as "not complex conceptually" but "an onerous one to resolve-involving as it did
the credibility of the witnesses on each side weighed against the witnesses' respective opportunities to observe and remember." 516 F.2d at 1044-45. Beckerman, holding that additional time
would not cure the jury's disagreement, simply declared that "It]he issues were not complicated."
516 F.2d at 910.
50. 516 F.2d at 910.
51. 516 F.2d at 1044.
52. Id. at 1045, quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
53. 516 F.2d at 1045, quoting 400 U.S. at 486.
54. 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
55. Id.at 849.
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jury in United States v. Goldstein,56 deliberated for only eight hours follow5
ing a five week trial involving complex issues and fifty possible verdicts. " Yet
in both cases reprosecution was permitted since the trial judge in each case
was held properly to have exercised his discretion to discharge the jury for
58
failure to reach a verdict.
The trial in United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court" lasted nine
days, after which the jury deliberated for fifteen hours on the question of a
witness' credibility. 60 The trial judge discharged the jury because he felt that
the jury was weary. 6' In United States v. Lansdown, 62 the trial was suddenly
aborted by the trial judge after the jury deliberated for approximately eleven
hours on testimony presented within one day. 63 In neither of these cases did
the appellate court accept the judgment of the trial court in discharging the
jury. 64

The foregoing cases suggest that the crucial factor in determining the
probability of jury agreement is not the length of jury deliberations, but is
65
rather a specific statement by the jury that it is hopelessly deadlocked.
56. 479 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973).
57. Id. at 1068.
58. In See, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge properly concluded "that further
deliberations would be inappropriate, given the length of time already spent, the complexity of
the case, and the clear assertions of the jury that they were hopelessly deadlocked." 505 F.2d at
852-53. In Goldstein, the Second Circuit based its decision on a theory of implied consent by the
defendant to the mistrial, but clearly stated that its decision was valid even in the absence of
consent. 479 F.2d at 1067-68. Affirming the broad discretion granted the trial judge in the
mistrial-hung jury situation, the court declared that "[tihe complexity of a case and the amount of
time requested by 12 reasonable jurors to reach unanimity on some or all of many possible
verdicts are determinations best left to a trial judge and are difficult to gauge by another district
judge or by appellate judges on a cold record." Id. at 1069.
59. 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973).
60. Id. at 10-11 & n.3.
61. Id.at 11.
62. 460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1972).
63. Id. at 166-69 & n.1.
64. In Lansdown, the Fourth Circuit found that there was no manifest necessity for the
mistrial and held that reprosecution was constitutionally improper because the trial judge simply
concluded that the jury had deliberated long enough although he made no inquiry as to whether
the jury thought that a verdict was possible. Moreover, the jury never indicated that it was
hopelessly deadlocked. Id. at 169-70. In fact, the foreman and another juror attempted to
convince the judge not to declare the mistrial because the jury was "on the verge" of a verdict. Id.
at 167. The Third Circuit's Russo decision was based on Lansdown. 483 F.2d at 16-17. The court
found that there was no manifest necessity to dismiss the jury on the basis of the physical
exhaustion of the jurors because the trial judge "did not ask the jury about its physical condition"
and the jury "never indicated that it was exhausted." Id. at 15.
65. See United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992
(1975), where the court agreed with Lansdown that the "crucial factor" is a statement by the jury
that it is unable to reach agreement. In addition, See distinguished both Lansdown and Russo,
since in those cases the jury had not indicated that it was hopelessly deadlocked. Id. at 853-54.
The court in See considered the length of jury deliberations to be "not a determinative factor."
Id. at 852. Lansdown made it clear that there was no "minimum period of time which a court
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Moreover, although it is "safer" for the judge to take a poll of the jurors to
determine whether there is a consensus that the jury is hung, federal courts
over the years have looked to the jury foreman as the spokesman for the panel
without soliciting the opinions of individual jurors.""
The presence of an objection by the defense counsel is also not a paramount
factor. From Perez through Somerville, it has been established that where
required by "manifest necessity," the trial judge may declare a mistrial
"without the defendant's consent and even over his67objection, and he may be
retried consistently with the Fifth AmendmenL"
Nor is the fact that the trial judge has initiated the inquiry into possible
jury deadlock, itself, a determining factor. In United States v. Phillips,68
after the jury deliberated for almost five hours, the trial judge submitted a
note to the jury asking how soon the jury would be able to agree on a verdict.
The response was that the jury had "no idea," whereupon the judge dismissed
the jury. 69 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.7 0 Because
there was no objection to the mistrial, the court did not hesitate to rely on
"the actions of an experienced trial judge who heard all the evidence, knew the
complexity or simplicity of the case, and decided further deliberation would be
71
vain."
must wait before declaring a mistrial because of a hung jury." 460 F.2d at 169. A comparison of
the length of trial and time spent in jury deliberations in other cases, all of which affirmed the trial
judge's dismissal of the jurors, reinforces the conclusion that this is not a determinative factor.
See, e.g., United States v. Brahm, 459 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972) (jury
deliberated for about five hours after a two day trial); United States v. Cording, 290 F.2d 392 (2d
Cir. 1961) (after short trial, jury deliberated for three hours and fifty minutes); Lynch v. United
States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951) (forty-eight hours of jury
deliberation after a five week trial); Emmons v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Ore. 1968)
(one day trial followed by six and one-half hours of deliberations); United States v. Fitz Gerald,
205 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. IM. 1962) (five hours of deliberations following a thirteen day tria);
United States v. Lee, 123 F. 741 (N.D. Cal. 1903) (jury dismissed after two and one-half hours of
deliberations).
For empirical data on the correlation between the length of a trial and the time in which a jury
may be expected to return a verdict or become deadlocked see H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The
American Jury (1966). Although cited by cases in support of the conclusion that a particular jury
would not come to agreement even with the benefit of additional time, the statistics have never
been held to be conclusive. See United States v. See, supra at 852.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
989 (1974); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873
(1974); United States v. Brahm, 459 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972);
Marienfeld v. United States, 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 865 (1954); Thames
v. Justices of Super. Ct., 383 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1974); McGuire v. Blubaum, 376 F. Supp.
284 (D. Ariz. 1974).
67. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961).
68. 431 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1970).
69. Id. at 950. Since there was no objection to the mistrial, the defense impliedly consented to
the jury discharge. Id.
70. Id. at 951.
71. Id. at 950-51. The decision was written by the same circuit court judge, who, four years
later, wrote the Webb opinion in which he criticized the trial judge for raising the issue of jury

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

The trial judge was held not to have abused his discretion in Grogan v.
United States, 72 where, after five hours of deliberation, he recalled the jury
and charged that upon unanimous agreement a verdict could be reached on
any of the counts concerning any of the defendants. 3 The judge reserved
decision on whether to declare a mistrial on those counts to which no verdict
would be forthcoming. 74 The jury again retired to the jury room and within
five minutes returned a verdict of acquittal against one defendant, but no
verdict as to the other three. "Because of the late hour and the inability of the
jurors to agree," the judge declared a mistrial. 75 The court of appeals held
that the mistrial did not prevent a retrial of any of the defendants because the

facts in the
case did "not warrant a deviation" from the manifest necessity
76

standard.
Moreover, in United States v. Fitz Gerald,77 the trial court, in a discussion
with the defendant and both counsel after the jury had retired, stated his

determination to discharge the jury unless it reached agreement within six
hours. 78 Upon failure to do so, the jury was discharged. Such dismissal did

not bar a subsequent prosecution of the defendant, since the appellate court
found no indication of an attempt by the trial court to thwart an acquittal by
the jury. 79

The fact that a defendant has already been subjected to two previous trials

which were aborted by the judge because of jury disagreement does not, by
itself, prohibit a third prosecution of the defendant. In United States v.

Castellanos,"0 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that further
prosecution did not violate the double jeopardy clause solely because two
deadlock sua sponte, although the jury foreman, in responsq to the judge, indicated that the jury
was incapable of agreement. 516 F.2d at 1043.
72. 394 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
73. Id. at 289 & n.1.
74. Id. at 290 & n.2.
75. Id. at 289.
76. Id. at 290. Similarly a mistrial did not prevent reprosecution in Emmons v. United States,
298 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D. Ore. 1968), where the judge raised the question of jury inability to
agree.
77. 205 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. III. 1962).
78. Id. at 515-16.
79. Id. at 518. Although the jury never indicated that it would be unable to reach a verdict,
the trial judge had determined at the outset of deliberations not to keep the jury deliberating into
the late hours of the night, so as not to create hardship for the jurors. Id. at 516. The court, in
reviewing a motion for acquittal, found this to be a proper exercise of the trial judge's discretion
because "it was not done at a moment when it was believed the jury was about to acquit the
defendant" therefore depriving him of an acquittal. Id. at 518. This should be contrasted to the
situation in United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1972), where the jury was
dismissed at 1:00 P.M., and the court of appeals in criticizing the trial judge, noted that "[tlhe
jurors would have suffered little additional hardship if required to remain at least until the end of
the day."
80. 478 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1973).
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previous trials of the accused had resulted in deadlocked juries.81 The court
stated:
It is obvious that the defendant's interest in a final determination before the first jury
he faces is not the only one here. If that were so, Perez would bar even the second
trial, and contrary to [settled law] there would be no retrials after appellate reversals.
But the cases dearly recognize that the accused's right to a quick determination on the
merits may in some instances be outweighed by the "ends of public justice," or put
another way, "the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments. " 8z
Similarly, even the Third Circuit, prior to the Webb decision, has allowed
83
reprosecution of defendants after the first two trials ended in jury deadlock.
There is conflict, however, in just how far the allowance of reprosecution
may be carried. At least one court 4 has concluded that there is no deprivation
of constitutional rights, even though defendants have been subjected to five
trials.8 5 Still another court 86 has found that where four previous prosecutions
had resulted in mistrials by reason of jury disagreement, trying
the defendants
87
a fifth time would violate the double jeopardy protection.
81. The court of appeals reversed the district court order which prohibited a third prosecution
of the defendant. Basing its decision on the ideas that a criminal trial puts a heavy personal strain
on a defendant and that an accused has an important interest in getting a final verdict out of the
first jury he faces, the district court had held that the double jeopardy clause did not allow more
than one retrial after mistrial. United States v. Castelanos, 349 F. Supp. 720, 722-23 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), rev'd, 478 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1973). The court of appeals held that because "the jury deadlocks
were genuine," each mistrial satisfied the manifest necessity test. Therefore, any double jeopardy
claim was "barred by Perez and its progeny." 478 F.2d at 752.
82. 478 F.2d at 752 (dtations omitted). The court of appeals criticized "limiting the government to two bites at the apple" because "such an approach is the kind of 'mechanical
application of an abstract formula' that the cases condemn." Id. The court concluded that "the
Perez standard itself.., embodies the appropriate balancing test [between the rights of the
accused and the public interestl--the defendant's interests bar retrial in all but those instances
where there is 'manifest necessity' for taking the case away from the jury. Since each mistrial was
properly declared.. . the Perez formulation tips the balance in the government's favor, and does
not constitutionally bar retrial." Id.
For an unfavorable review of the Second Circuit's Castellanos decision see Note, Double
Jeopardy and Hung Juries: United States v. Castellanos, S Rutgers-Camden L.J. 218 (1974). That
Note approves of the opinion of the district court in Castellanos and advocates releasing an
accused who has gone through two mistrials, although each was properly declared.
83. United States v. Corbitt, 368 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 497 F.2d 922 (3d
Cir. 1974).
84. United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970).
85. The first and third trials ended in mistrial because of jury disagreement. The second and
fourth trials resulted in conviction but were reversed on appeal. Id. at 1377. Without even
mentioning the double jeopardy clause as a possible limitation, the court of appeals held that retrying
the defendants for a fifth time was constitutionally permitted. Id. at 1384-85.
86. Preston v. Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
87. The court decided that "jeopardy attached" when the government began a fifth prosecution of the defendants, and held that the rights of an accused should not be "subordinated to the
demands of public justice after four trials have resulted in hung juries." Id. at 687.
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The Second Circuit's Beckerman decision is the latest in a series of federal
cases reaffirming the broad discretion of the trial judge in declaring a mistrial
once he determines that the jury is unable to agree on a verdict. 88 In Webb,
decided the same day as Beckerman, the Third Circuit took a different
approach and sharply scrutinized the actions of the trial court. It concluded
that because the defendant had already twice gone through the "heavy
personal strain" of a criminal trial, a higher judicial standard of care was
mandated before the state could subject him to yet another trial. 89 The trial
judge in Webb did not meet that standard of care and therefore abused his
discretion. 90
Although Webb and Beckerman are obviously not factually alike, the
factors in Webb seemingly could have supported the conclusion, based on
prior case law, that there was no abuse of the "broad discretion" traditionally
reserved to the trial judge in the mistrial-hung jury area. The recent decisions
on this topic reveal that the "crucial factor" contributing to the trial judge's
discretion in declaring a mistrial is an indication by the jury that it cannot
reach agreement. 91 Where this factor is absent, retrial has generally been
prohibited. 92 But where the jury has stated that it was deadlocked, retrial has
been permitted in conformity with the fifth amendment. 93 Whether the
statement was made by the foreman as spokesman for the jury or by each
juror separately is, in light of prior case law, not an important consideration. 94 Nor do the decisions place great significance on whether the judge or
the jury initiates the inquiry into the possibility of deadlock. 9" Furthermore,
the length of jury deliberation, while important, has uniformly been considered not crucial. 96 Prior to the Webb decision, both the Second and Third
Circuits have held that the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit a third
prosecution after two trials previously have ended in jury disagreement. 97
Preston distinguished Persico because there the retrials did not result entirely from hung juries.
Rather, some were the result of successful intervening appeals by defendants. Id. at 688, The
Preston court relied on Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where it was held

that three mistrials violated the double jeopardy prohibition. But in that case, while the first two
mistrials were due to hung juries, the third trial was aborted because the defense counsel
mentioned the previous mistrials in his dosing argument. The Carsey court held that the third
mistrial declaration was improper, and, therefore, reprosecution was not permitted. Id. at 811-12.
Since all four mistrials in Preston were properly declared because of juror disagreement, Carsey Is
also distinguishable. Therefore, Preston's reliance on Carsey may be misplaced.
88. 516 F.2d at 910.
89. 516 F.2d at 1045. Although a trial judge must exercise "extreme caution" before declaring
a mistrial, the existence of the prior proceedings in Webb required "the exercise of even greater
caution." Id. at 1042, 1045.
90.

Id. at 1045.

91.

See, e.g., United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992

(1975).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See
See
See
See
See
See

note 64 supra.
note 65 supra and accompanying text.
note 66 supra and accompanying text.
notes 68-79 supra and accompanying text.
notes 54-65 supra and accompanying text.
notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text.
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Webb, while demanding "greater caution" on the part of the trial judge
before exercising discretion to discharge the jury in a defendant's second
trial, 98 does not provide guidance as to the circumstances under which the
judge would be able properly to declare a mistrial. A reading of the case
suggests that had the jury, rather than the trial judge, first raised the spectre
of deadlock and had the trial court asked the full panel, rather than only the
foreman, about the prospects for agreement, the court of appeals would
probably have affirmed the decision of the trial judge. 99 In light of precedent,
however, it is clear that the factors governing the trial judge's decision all
point to a traditionally permissible declaration of mistrial. Webb should be
regarded as a maverick decision which seeks to protect the individual from
the "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" of having to undergo repeated
prosecutions, even where this is due to mistrials which were properly declared
under the manifest necessity doctrine. Webb certainly does not advocate a
"mechanical rule" which always prohibits a third trial following two mistrials.
The decision does stand for the idea that, out of a solicitude for the protection
of the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, the trial judge's traditional
discretion to declare a mistrial is to be restricted when the defendant has
already been through a previous prosecution. Hopefully, future decisions by
appellate courts will follow the lead of Webb in order to safeguard an accused
from being subjected to a "continuing state of anxiety and insecurity" and to
diminish the possibility "that even though innocent he may be found
'100
guilty.
Ephrain Savitt
98. 516 F.2d at 1045.
99. See id. at 1044 n.57.
100. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).

